Decisions for submissions to FEW2019 have been made. Out of 86 submissions, we have accepted 20 papers as contributed talks and six more submissions for special format sessions (proof of concept, tutorials).

The conference will be held at the premises of the University of Turin, in three adjacent buildings in the city center:

  • Palazzo del Rettorato (Via Verdi, 8—also accessible from Via Po)
  • Cavallerizza Reale (Via Verdi, 9)
  • Palazzo Badini-Confalonieri (Via Verdi 10)

Below you find the program in chronological order. Regular talks take 60 minutes, including commentary and discussion time. Keynotes, tutorials and proof-of-concept sessions take 75 minutes.

Poster titles, explanations on special sessions (proof-of-concept, tutorials) and abstracts of invited speakers are at the bottom of this page.

Wednesday, 19 June

8:30–9:15 Coffee and Registration
Loggia, Palazzo del Rettorato
9:15—9:30 Opening and Greetings
Professor Gianmaria Ajani, Rector of the University of Turin
Aula Magna, Palazzo del Rettorato
9:30—10:45 Keynote speaker #1: Stephan Hartmann (LMU Munich)
“The Distance-Based Approach to Bayesianism”
Aula Magna, Palazzo del Rettorato
Chair: Kenny Easwaran
10:45—11:10 Coffee Break Courtyard, Palazzo Badini
Contributed Papers
Session 1A: Belief & Truthlikeness
Sala Seminari, Palazzo Badini
Chair: Branden Fitelson
Session 1B: Evidence
Sala Lauree di Lingue, Palazzo Badini
Chair: Stephan Hartmann
11:10—12:10 Jason Konek (University of Bristol):
“Epistemic Interpretivism”
Anna-Maria A. Eder (University of Cologne) and Peter Brössel (Ruhr University Bochum):
“Evidence of Evidence as Higher-Order Evidence”
Commentary by Mike Titelbaum (University of Wisconsin-Madison) Commentary by Nick Leonard (San Francisco)
12:20—13:20 Gustavo Cevolani (IMT Lucca):
“Rational belief, probability, and truthlikeness: a plea for strong fallibilism”
Barbara Osimani (Marche Polytechnical University, Ancona) and Jürgen Landes (LMU Munich):
“Varieties of Error and Varieties of Evidence in Scientific Inference”
Commentary by Jeanne Peijnenburg (RU Groningen) Commentary by Borut Trpin (Salzburg/LMU Munich)
13:20—15:00 Lunch Break
Contributed Papers
Session 2A: More Truthlikeness
Sala Seminari, Palazzo Badini
Chair: Gustavo Cevolani
Session 2B: Rationality
Sala Lauree di Lingue, Palazzo Badini
Chair: Carlotta Pavese
15:00—16:00 Miriam Schoenfield (MIT, Cambridge/MA):
“Accuracy and Verisimilitude: The Good, The Bad and the Ugly”
Julia Staffel (University of Colorado, Boulder):
“Pro Tem Rationality”
Commentary by Stefan Lukits (British Columbia Institute of Technology) Commentary by Diego Marconi (University of Turin)
16:00—16:15 Coffee Break
16:15—17:30 Proof-of-Concept Session
Session 3A: Models of Belief
Sala Seminari, Palazzo Badini
Chair: Seamus Bradley
Session 3B: Epistemology Meets Economics
Sala Lauree di Lingue, Palazzo Badini
Chair: Peter Brössel
Jesse Clifton (North Carolina State University, Raleigh): “Reliable credence and the foundations of statistics” Mariangela Zoe Cocchiaro and Bryan Frances (Hong Kong University): “The Significance of Economics for the Epistemology of Peer Disagreement”
Brian Talbot (University of Colorado, Boulder):
“Formal deontological epistemology: advantages and challenges”
Patricia Rich (University of Hamburg) and Hailin Liu (Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangdong):
“Reconciling Individual and Group Rationality Through Strategic Reasoning”
17:30—19:00 Aperiposter Session (see below for list of posters)
Courtyard, Palazzo Badini

Thursday, 20 June

Session 4A
Sala Lauree di Psicologia, Palazzo Badini
Session 4B
Sala Seminari, Palazzo Badini
9:30—10:45 Vincenzo Crupi (University of Turin):
“Entropies, Uncertainty, and Information”
Seamus Bradley (University of Leeds):
“Belief Models and Their Aggregation”
10:45—11:10 Coffee Break
Contributed Papers
Session 5A: Inductive Inference
Sala Lauree di Psicologia, Palazzo Badini
Chair: Mike Titelbaum
Session 5B: Logic & Epistemology
Sala Seminari, Palazzo Badini
Chair: Andrea Iacona
11:10—12:10 Olav Benjamin Vassend (Nanyang Technological University, Singapore):
“Justifying the Norms of Inductive Inference”
Annina Loets (Oxford University):
“Choice Points for a Logic of Normality”
Commentary by David Atkinson (RU Groningen) Commentary by Stefano Bonzio (Marche Polytechnical University)
12:20—13:20 Tom Sterkenburg (LMU Munich) and Rianne De Heide (CWI, Amsterdam): “The Truth-Convergence of Open-Minded Bayesianism” Julien Murzi, Leonie Eichhorn and Philipp Mayr (University of Salzburg):
“Surprise surprise: KK is innocent”
Commentary by Jan Sprenger (University of Turin) Commentary by Michael Cohen (Stanford University)
13:20—15:00 Lunch Break
Contributed Papers
Session 6A: Statistical Inference
Sala Lauree di Psicologia, Palazzo Badini
Chair: Barbara Osimani
Session 6B: More Logic & Epistemology
Sala Seminari, Palazzo Badini
Chair: Julien Murzi
15:00—16:00 Conor Mayo-Wilson, Aditya Saraf and Soham Pardeshi (University of Washington, Seattle):
“QUOL: Qualitative, Objective Likelihoodism”
Peter Hawke (ILLC, Amsterdam):
“Missed Clues and Relevant Alternatives”
Commentary by Jan-Willem Romeijn (RU Groningen) Commentary by Julien Dutant (King’s College, London)
16:00—16:15 Coffee Break
Contributed Papers
Session 7A: Testimony
Sala Lauree di Psicologia, Palazzo Badini
Chair: Anna-Maria Eder
Session 7B: Even More Logic & Epistemology
Sala Seminari, Palazzo Badini
Chair: Paul Égré
16:15—17:15 Rush Stewart (LMU Munich) and Michael Nielsen (Columbia University, New York):
“On the Possibility of Testimonial Justice”
Francesco Berto (University of St. Andrews and ILLC, Amsterdam) and Aybüke Özgün (ILLC, Amsterdam):
“Dynamic Hyperintensional Belief Revision”
Commentary by Joe Roussos (London School of Economics) Commentary by Edward Elliot (University of Leeds)
20:00— Conference Dinner
(Ristorante Esperia, Corso Moncalieri 2)

Friday, 21 June

9:30—10:45 Keynote speaker #2: Ulrike Hahn (Birkbeck College, London)
“Knowledge from Social Networks—the Good, the Bad and the Ugly”
Aula Magna, Palazzo del Rettorato
Chair: Vincenzo Crupi
10:45—11:10 Coffee Break
Contributed Papers
Session 8A: Conditionals
Aula Magna, Palazzo del Rettorato
Chair: Julia Staffel
Session 8B: Decision Theory
Sala Multifunzione, Cavallerizza Reale
Chair: Conor Mayo-Wilson
11:10—12:10 Hans Rott (University of Regensburg):
“Difference-making conditionals and the Relevant Ramsey Test”
Reuben Stern (Leibniz University Hannover):
“An Interventionist’s Guide to Exotic Choice”
Commentary by Carlotta Pavese (Duke University) Commentary by Melissa Fusco (Columbia University)
12:20—13:20 Lorenzo Rossi (University of Salzburg), Paul Égré (CNRS/Paris Sorbonne) and Jan Sprenger (University of Turin):
“De Finettian Logics of Indicative Conditionals”
Pablo Zendejas Medina (University of Pittsburgh):
“Conditionalization, Modesty, and Plan Coherence”
Commentary by Paolo Santorio (UC San Diego) Commentary by Branden Fitelson (Northeastern University)
13:20—15:00 Lunch Break
Contributed Papers
Session 9A: Supposition
Aula Magna, Palazzo del Rettorato
Chair: Ulrike Hahn
Session 9B: Probability
Sala Multifunzione, Cavallerizza Reale
Chair: Michele Lubrano
15:00—16:00 Benjamin Eva (University of Konstanz), Ted Shear (University of Queensland, Brisbane) and Branden Fitelson (Northeastern University, Boston): “Four Approaches to Supposition” Jeremy Strasser (Australian National University, Canberra):
“Is Almost Everywhere Convergence an Epistemic Ideal?”
Commentary by Michal Sikorski (University of Turin) Commentary by Kenny Easwaran (Texas A&M)
16:00—16:15 Coffee Break
16:15—17:30 Keynote speaker #3: Paul Égré (Unversité de la Sorbonne and École Normale Supérieure, Paris)
“Justified Approximation”
Aula Magna, Palazzo del Rettorato
Chair: Jan Sprenger

Saturday, 22 June

Meeting: 9:15–9:30
Porta Nuova Station, main entrance
Social Excursion to the Sacra di San Michele

  • Train 9:45 from Porta Nuova to Sant’Ambrogio (35′)
  • Walking to the abbey (ca. 1:30, possible with normal shoes)
  • Visiting the abbey
  • Descent to Sant’Ambrogio
  • Return to Turin (arrival between 15 and 16h)

The Sacra di San Michele is the Piedmont’s most iconic example of sacral architecture in a unique location overlooking the Val di Susa and the Padan plain. It was also used by the famous (Piemontese) writer Umberto Eco as a model for his novel “The name of the rose”. See also the Wikipedia page.

Those who would rather arrive by public transport than by walking should take the 10:15 train to Avigliana (30′) and use the shuttle service from there (bus leaves at 11:00). Arrival at the Sacra will then be similar to the main group. There is also a direct shuttle from Turin (see the above link).

The weather in the morning is supposed to fine; we should be on the train to Turin before the rain starts.

Costs are 2x 3,50 € for the train and 8 € for the visit (for those interested).

Proof-of-Concept Session

The proof-of-concept session presents new approaches to classical problems, often transferred from different (sub)disciplines (e.g., statistics, game theory, ethics). The goal is to enrich the set of methods and techniques in formal epistemology and to bring them to the attention of a wider audience.


We go back to the roots of FEW as a workshop where useful, but perhaps not very familiar techniques are explained. Therefore we have included a tutorial session on the morning of Thursday 20 June.

List of Poster Presentations

Posters will be presented in an informal atmosphere, with drinks and bites.

  • Stefano Bonzio (Ancona): On the notion of Joint-Coherence
  • David Boylan (Rutgers) and Ginger Schultheis (NYU): Attitudes, Conditionals, and Stalnaker’s Thesis
  • Mariangela Zoe Cocchiaro (Hongkong): Significance of Economics for the Epistemology of Peer Disagreement
  • Michael Cohen (Stanford): Inexact Knowledge and Dynamic Introspection
  • Davide Fassio (Zhejiang) and Julien Dutant (King’s College London): On the distinction between practical and theoretical certainty
  • Melissa Fusco (Columbia): Imaging As Conditionalization
  • Pavel Janda (Gdansk): Accurate Credences in Time-Centred Propositions
  • Koray Karaca (Twente): A value-based epistemological framework for machine learning accountability
  • Alexander Kocurek (UC Berkeley): Counterlogicals
  • Ko-Hung Kuan (LSE): Beyond Linear Conciliation
  • Kenneth Lai (Brandeis): A Dynamic Semantics for Causal Counterfactuals
  • Jürgen Landes (LMU Munich): The Variety of Evidence Thesis and its Dependence on Degrees of Independence
  • Nick Leonard (San Francisco): Belief and Rational Indeterminacy
  • Michele Lubrano (Turin): A Kairetic Account of Explanation in Mathematics
  • Stefan Lukits (Toronto): Asymmetry and the Geometry of Reason
  • Paolo Maffezioli (Barcelona): On the logic for preference relations
  • Krzysztof Mierzewski (Stanford): Tracking Bayesian conditioning with probabilistically stable beliefs: how AGM revision arises from the maximum entropy principle
  • Sven Moritz Silvester Neth (UC Berkeley): Measuring Belief and Risk Attitude
  • William Peden (Ancona): Ambiguity and the Ravens Paradox
  • Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson (RU Groningen): A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for the Transitivity of Probabilistic Support
  • Francesco Praolini (Cologne): No Justificatory Closure without Truth
  • Patricia Rich (Hamburg): Reconciling Individual and Group Rationality Through Strategic Reasoning
  • Luis Rosa (Cologne): Good reasoning from/to agnostic attitudes
  • Joe Roussos (LSE): Formal Epistemology as Modeling
  • Michal Sikorski, Noah van Dongen and Jan Sprenger (Turin): Causal Strength, Tendency Causal Claims, and Indicative Conditionals
  • Caterina Sisti (Pisa) and Mario Günther (Regensburg): Ramsey’s Counterfactuals
  • Brian Talbot (Boulder): Formal deontological epistemology: advantages and challenges
  • Borut Trpin (Salzburg): On some consequences of Jeffrey Conditionalisation
  • Timothy Luke Williamson (ANU): Ambivalence About Death in Damascus
  • Adrian Ziolkowski (Warsaw): Explaining away Undesired Knowledge Attributions: Protagonist Projection

Abstracts of Invited Speakers

Paul Égré: Justified Approximation

Why is our language vague? One plausible explanation is that in contexts in which a cooperative speaker is not perfectly informed about the world, the use of vague expressions offers an optimal tradeoff between truthfulness and informativeness. In this paper, this hypothesis is substantiated by examining the meaning of the numerical
approximator “around”. We compare the use of “around” with the expression of precise intervals involving “between”, and explain, using a Bayesian model of interpretation, how “around” allows a rational hearer to infer a better probabilistic representation of the uncertain distribution the speaker has in mind, and allows a rational speaker to better communication the uncertain information he or she has in mind.

The talk is based on joint work with A. Mortier, B. Spector, and S. Verheyen.

Stephan Hartmann: The Distance-Based Approach to Bayesianism

Bayesianism is currently our best theory of uncertain reasoning with many applications in philosophy and related fields. In this talk, I will first present the standard approach to Bayesianism which recommends (Jeffrey) conditionalization as the canonical updating method. I will then point out several limitations of the standard approach and propose the distance-based approach to Bayesianism as a remedy. The distance-based approach generalizes the standard approach and has many important applications, such as modeling the learning of conditional information. It also allows us to address “the problem of the algebra”, i.e. the problem of how to specify the new probability distribution after adding a new variable to the algebra. Finally, I apply the distance-based approach to the problem of probability aggregation and show how the proposed methodology can be used to provide a rational justification of the probability weighting functions used in Prospect Theory

Ulrike Hahn: Knowledge from social networks—the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

Testimony is central to our beliefs about the world, prompting normative concerns about how epistemic agents should respond to the testimony of others. Yet much research on testimony that has considered normative questions has focussed only on dyads: an agent in exchange with a single source. However, those sources are themselves typically part of wider social networks. Examining putative normative strategies for dealing with the testimony of less than fully reliable sources in both individual and collective contexts reveals features of those strategies that would not be apparent in either context alone, and provides reasons for normative re-evaluation. The talk outlines findings from behavioural experiments and agent-based simulations to provide a more in-depth understanding of central intuitions about testimony.